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various programs would seem to require such access. The lack of a specific
legislative provision for access rights is immaterial; the development of the
labor law under the National Labor Relations Act, in which there was a similar
lack of specific provision, has shown that they may be fairly implied when
necessary to accomplish the legislative mandate.' The needed establishment of
access rights in this area will probably be achieved in future cases either by a
recognition of the constitutional rights involved or by a pragmatic balancing of
the owners' property rights with access rights fairly implied from the stated
purposes of the Economic Opportunity Act.
Boyd Mangrum

Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond:
The Permissible Scope of Inquiry by Bar Admission
Committees into an Applicant's Beliefs
Law students, organizations of law students, and applicants to the bar,' in a
combined class action sought injunctive and declaratory relief' to have invalidated' certain parts of the New York procedure governing admissions to the
state bar. The bar admissions standards were administered by the defendants,
members of the Committee on Character and Fitness of Applicants for Admission to the Bar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
in the First and Second Judicial Departments.4 The plaintiffs, the lead plaintiff
being the Law Students Civil Rights Research Council (LSCRRC), attacked
the statutory scheme,' specific rules,' and questions' designed to determine
workers, its disposition will affect the government's ability, at least in the State
of New Jersey, to ensure the continued effective operation of farm worker
assistance programs.
Id. at 1.
05 See, e.g., note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
'The first named plaintiff, the Law Student's Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., draws
upon 1500 law students from sixty law schools throughout the United States. The stated
principal objectives of this nonprofit corporation are nonpartisan research and active participation in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties. Included as plaintiffs in this case
were individuals who had taken and passed the written exam required for admission to the
New York Bar.
'28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1971), provides for declaratory and other relief.
'The suits were brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1971).
4 N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 9401, 9404, provide for the appointment of a character committee
for each judicial district in a department by the respective appellate division and authorize
these committees to prescribe questionnaires. New York is divided by law into four judicial
departments. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90 (McKinney 1968).
'To gain admission to the state bar of New York one must meet certain entrance requirements. In addition to the normal residency and examination requirements, New York
also requires that the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court in the judicial department where an applicant resides must "be satisfied that such person possesses the character
and general fitness requisite for an attorney and Counsellor-at-law." N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW
§ 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1968). To carry out this statutory requirement, committees on
character and fitness receive affidavits from two persons acquainted with applicant (one of
whom must be a practicing attorney), and a questionnaire completed by the applicant. The
committees also conduct personal interviews with each applicant. As the final step before
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whether an applicant possessed the required character and general fitness for
admission to the bar primarily on grounds of first amendment vagueness and
overbreadth. The LSCRRC challenged the admission procedure, not because any
applicant had ever been unjustifiably denied permission to practice law in New
York, but on the basis that it worked a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of
free speech and association of law students. With the exception of certain items
on the questionnaire which were found to be so vague, overbroad, and intrusive
on the applicant's privacy that they were of doubtful constitutional validity, the
three-judge district court sustained the validity of the procedure and upheld the
statute and rules as valid on their face.' Held, affirmed: New York's carefully
administered screening system does not necessarily result in a chilling of the
exercise of constitutional freedoms, and the statutes and rules used to ascertain
the character and general fitness of applicants to the bar are constitutional.
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971).
I. STATE'S INTERESTS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Admission to the Bar. Each state has its own standards by which it selects prospective applicants for the bar.' Generally, it is required that applicants pass a
written proficiency test on the laws of the state, that they swear to uphold the
state and federal constitutions, that they do not advocate the violent overthrow
of the government, and that each applicant possess the proper moral character
for an attorney at law."
No significant challenge to bar admission standards was made until 1957.
In Konigsberg v. State Bar1' (Konigsberg I) an applicant had been denied admission to the California bar on the grounds that he had failed to meet his
burden of proof." Konigsberg had refused to answer the bar committee's quesadmission to the bar, the applicant must take an oath that he will support the United States
and New York Constitutions. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW 5 466
(McKinney 1968).
'The LSCRRC concentrated their challenge on N.Y.R. Civ. PEAc. 9406:
PROOF
No person shall receive said certificate from any committee and no person
shall be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts
of this state, unless he shall furnish satisfactory proof to the effect:
1. that he believes in the form of the government of the United States and
is loyal to such government;
2. that he is a citizen of the United States;
3. that he has been an actual resident of the state of New York for six months
prior to the filing of his application for admission to practice; and
4. that he has complied with all the requirements of this rule and with all
the requirements of the applicable statutes of this state, the applicable rules
of the court of appeals and the applicable rules of the appellate division in
which his application is pending, relating to the admission to practice as an
attorney and counselor at law.
' See note 60 infra, and accompanying text.
I Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
9 J. BRENNER, REPORTS OF CONSULTANT AND THE ADvISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE ON BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 77-123

(1952).
1

See National Conference of Bar Examiners, THE BAR

EXAMINERS

HANDBOOK

(1968).
11 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
1 Konigsberg had allegedly failed to prove that he was of good moral character and
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tions concerning his past and present affiliation with the Communist Party. The
Supreme Court held that the evidence submitted to the committee did not support the two grounds upon which admission was denied and that no inference
of bad moral character could be drawn from a refusal to answer.'3 In Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners4 an applicant to the New Mexico bar had been denied
a permit to take the written examination on the grounds that he had not shown
good moral character. The applicant was found not to possess the required
moral character because of incidents and affiliations in his past. 5 The Supreme
Court held unanimously that Schware had been denied due process of law. The
Court reviewed all the evidence in the case and found that none of the facts
could disprove Schware's showing of good moral character. The Court found
no rational connection between past membership in the Communist Party and
present moral character."

While the Court would not let arbitrary or discretionary decisions by state
bar officials result in an applicant being denied certification to practice law,
the noncooperation of an applicant could result in denial of admission to the
bar. The Court has held that when an applicant refuses to answer bar committee's questions, he is obstructing a full investigation into his qualifications, and
the state is, therefore, justified in denying his application."7 This obstruction rule
was the theory the Court relied on in sustaining state decisions that had denied
applicants the right to enter the bar."
Although the obstruction rule has never been expressly overruled, the Court's
recent decisions in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona" and In re Stolar," companion
that he did not believe in or advocate the overthrow of the government by unconstitutional
means. 353 U.S. at 253.
13353 U.S. at 262. The Court reserved judgment on the issue of whether Konigsberg
could be properly denied admission solely on the grounds of his refusal to answer.
14353 U.S. 232 (1957).
"' In the past Schware had been arrested in several labor disputes prior to 1940, employed certain aliases during his earlier years, and been a member of the Communist Party.
Schware was never indicted or tried as a result of any of his arrests. 353 U.S. at 234.
16"A state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or
proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." Id. at 239.
'"Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Konigsberg II). The Court reasoned
that since the burden of proof is upon the applicant, once that applicant has made a prima
facie case of good moral character the investigating committee could attempt to refute that
case by evidence of bad character. Because of the committee's inability to conduct a full
independent investigation, it must rely on the interrogation of the applicant during the
meetings. If an applicant refused to answer the questions put to him by the committee he
was obstructing the committee from performing its proper function. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, stated: "We think it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to questions having a substantial
relevance to his qualifications." Id. at 44.
"Id. See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Konigsberg II and Anastaplo stand
for the proposition that an applicant's refusal to answer investigation questions can be
grounds for his exclusion from practicing law in a state on the premise that his uncooperation
obstructs the committee's function. The procedural safeguards that now surround disbarment
proceedings cast a new reflection upon the possible validity of cases like Konigsberg II and
Anastaplo. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117 (1961), the Court held that the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause is applicable to disbarment proceedings, and an attorney who invokes the amendment during a
disbarment hearing cannot be disbarred solely because of his use of the self-incrimination
protection.
" 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
20401 U.S. 23 (1971).
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cases of Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,1 cast
serious doubt on the continuing validity of the rule. The facts in both cases
were similar. Baird and Stolar had been denied admission to practice law in
Arizona and Ohio respectively. Each had refused to answer questions put to
him concerning his past and present membership in the Communist Party
or any other organizations that advocated the overthrow of the United States
Government by force or violence." In both cases the Court reversed their denials of admission and upheld their right to refuse to answer the questions put

to them.'
Public Employment and Limitations on Scope of State's Inquiry. Loyalty tests
as a condition of employment were common during the early 1950's. The Supreme Court, in analyzing these cases, was able to equalize the interests of the
individual by means of the broad concept of due process. The Court upheld the
validity of the oath requirement as not violative of due process in the majority
of these cases."
As the McCarthy period ended and more challenges to these loyalty-security
programs began to appear, the Court began to reevaluate the practice of conditioning public employment or benefits on a limitation of first amendment
freedoms. Therefore, a California statute requiring applicants for a veteran's
property tax to bear the burden of proving their nonsubversive nature was held
unconstitutional as a limitation of free speech and a denial of due process.'
Furthermore, the Court has also rejected the contention that state legislators
21401 U.S. 154 (1971).
22In Baird the petitioner was asked, among other things, to reveal all organizations with

which she had been associated since she reached 16 years of age, and she was asked to state
whether she had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization "that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence." 401 U.S. at 4-5.
The questions in Stolar were:
12. State whether you have been, or presently are . . . (g) a member of any
organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United
States by force ....
13. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of
which you are or have been a member.
7. List the names and addresses of all clubs, societies or organizations of which
you are or have been a member since registering as a law student.
401 U.S. at 27.
' The Court in Stolar held that Ohio could not require that an applicant for admission
to the bar state his present or past affiliations with any organization advocating the overthrow of the United States Government by force. 401 U.S. at 30. The Court in Baird stated:
"Without detailed reference to all prior cases it is sufficient to say we hold that views and
beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law." 401 U.S. at 7-8. It should be noted that in
Baird and Stolar detailed information had been given to the bar committees. In the case of
Stolar, his entire file concerning his admission to the bar in New York was in the hands
of the Ohio committee. Sara Baird had given the Arizona committee extensive personal and
professional information listing all former employers, law school professors, and other references. Also, in Arizona it is perjury to answer bar committee's questions falsely. ARIZ.
REV. 4 STAT. ANN. § 13-561 (1956).
" See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). But see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), in which a state statute requiring employees to
swear that they did not or had not belonged to certain specified organizations was held invalid because it did not make an employee's knowledge of the nature or purpose of such
organization a consideration.
23Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). "The man who knows that he must bring
forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far
wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens." Id. at 526.
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have the right to test the sincerity with which another duly elected representative has taken the oath of office.2"
The Court's dislike of public employment or benefits being conditioned on
limitations of first amendment freedoms was vividly seen in the area of public
education. An Arkansas statute which required, as a condition of employment in
a state-supported school or college, that annually every teacher file an affidavit
listing without limit every organization to which he had belonged or regularly
contributed during the preceding five years was struck down as depriving teachers of their right of associational freedom." Loyalty oaths as a condition to employment were struck down numerous times because of broad, vague, and uncertain terms.' When regulatory schemes and state loyalty oaths were so vague
"as to make men of common intelligence speculate at their peril on its meaning,"29 or when they operated "to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively protected by the Constitution,"3 the Court has refused to let them
stand.
While the Court dealt strongly with state statutes and regulatory schemes
that had deterrent effects on first amendment liberties, it did not ever hold that
loyalty oaths per se were unconstitutional. The loyalty oath system that does
not offend first amendment rights and due process, and still serves the interest
of a state has not been clearly defined by the Court. It did affirm a lower court
holding that New York could reasonably require teachers in public or taxexempt institutions to subscribe to an oath supporting the federal and state
constitutions, and to promise compliance with professional standards of competence and dedication.31
Scienter-Intent Requirement. The Court has shown a continued adherence to
the proposition that state regulations and investigatory schemes should not be so
random and broad as to include both innocent and illegal conduct within the
ban of their prohibitions. The Court has feared that constitutionally protected
political expression and associations might be inhibited by blanket prohibitions
2'Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). The Georgia legislature contended that statements made by Bond concerning national foreign policy and the selective-service system rendered him unable to take the constitutional oath of office with sincerity. Id. at 130.
27Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now before us brings it
within the ban of our prior cases. The statute's comprehensive interference
with association freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into fitness and competency of its teachers.
Id. at 490.
21Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). The Florida statute involved in this case required all employees to swear that they had never "knowingly lent
their aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist Party." Id. at 279. In
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), the Court noted that:
Those with a conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or affirm,
sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, avoid the risk
of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited.
Id. at 372.
29
Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59 (1967).
"°Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
" Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a/I'd per curiam,
390 U.S. 36 (1968).
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of organizations having both legal and illegal aims.8' It became established (in
Communist Party criminal prosecution cases) that when the governmental purpose is to regulate associational freedoms, the statute must require that the individual be a knowing, active member with the specific intent of furthering the
organization's unlawful objectives."'
The guidelines that the Court had established in Communist Party criminal
prosecutions were used as a basis for determining the constitutionality of state
loyalty-security programs. 4 When a state statute did not require active membership with the specific intent of achieving the overthrow of the government by
force or violence, the oath required by the statute was held to infringe unnecessarily on the freedom of association protected by the Constitution.' The Court
went so far as to invalidate an entire security investigation system for failing to
provide an effective method of determining whether an individual employee of
the state had the necessary intent to carry out the illegal purposes of the organization even if he had knowledge of those purposes.' The Court's adherence to
a requirement of knowledge of the illegal purposes of the organization coupled
with the specific intent to further those purposes became a limitation on the
scope of state loyalty-security programs.
Chilling Effect. When a statute or regulation is challenged on the grounds that
it chills the exercise of first amendment liberties, the chilling effect doctrine has
been used: (1) to justify the relaxation of rules which inhibit the litigation of
constitutional claims in the federal courts; (2) as proof of irreparable injury
and a basis for injunctive relief; and (3) to demonstrate the need to create a
substantive immunity from governmental control."7 However, the fact that a
law chills free speech or association creates no absolute presumption that the
law is unconstitutional; rather, the Court continues to employ a balancing
test.' A significant factor to be considered when applying the balancing test,
especially when free speech or association are concerned, is the effect a "chilling"
law will have on others in the same situation and class as the plaintiff."'
" See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
'Id. at 230. The two elements needed to sustain criminal prosecutions set out in Scales
were projected in the Court's decisions in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964), and United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
.Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
'Id. "Those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who
do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens or public
employees." Id. at 17.
36 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). "Thus, mere Party membership, even with knowledge of Party's unlawful goals, cannot suffice to justify criminal punishment . . . ; nor may it warrant a finding of moral unfitness justifying disbarment." Id.
at 607, citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). The same provision challenged in this case had been sustained earlier by the Court in Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). In Adler the Court had indicated that if teachers did not agree
with the terms set by the school authorities, then they should retain their beliefs and seek
work elsewhere. The Court in Keyishian replied to that premise: "It is too late in the day
to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 385 U.S. at 606.
" Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
4' See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 91 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 125-34 (1959).
"In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), a case concerning loyalty oaths required of all prospective teachers, the Court recognized this problem:
Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers affects not only
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Laws, regulations, or investigations that impose a duty upon organizations to
divulge the names and addresses of members have been declared to have an
unconstitutionally inhibitory effect upon freedom of association." The same
result has been reached when individuals were forced to disclose their associational ties and activities, because the disclosure demanded could lead to repression of opinions of those exposed to public hostility, to the refusal of members
to renew organizational ties, and could dissuade others from joining the organization.41 The threat of a perjury prosecution in a loyalty oath system can have
a similar chilling effect on associational rights.' The Supreme Court has found
the exercise of associational rights chilled by oaths that discourage continued
association with a certain organization,43 or result in an individual's forbearance
from protected expression or conduct." Oaths can also discourage individuals
from seeking certain types of employment.'
Although a determination that a demand for disclosure chills the exercise
of first amendment freedoms will not automatically result in unconstitutionality,
it does substantially narrow the scope of permissible inquiry. The Court has used
the scienter and specific intent requirements to see that the inquiry is directed
only at active participation in an organization by an individual who has knowledge of the organization's illegal aims and intends to further those aims."'

III. LAW STUDENTS CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH COUNCIL V. WADMOND
In Wadmond the Supreme Court held the statutory bar admission procedure
administered by the State of New York constitutional. In upholding the New
York system, the Court used a step-by-step method. By pyramiding conclusions,
the Court avoided the major emphasis of the LSCRRC attack-that the New
York system, by its very existence, worked a "chilling effect" upon the free
exercise of first amendment rights.
The first step in the Court's analysis was to validate New York's requirement that applicants to the bar possess the character and general fitness of an
attorney at law. The Court unanimously agreed that states can require certain
those who . . . are immediately before the Court. It has an unmistakable
tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially
to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations
by potential teachers.
Id. 4at 195. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1967).
See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
41See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959);
Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957).
'See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
'See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); American Communications Assoc. v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
"See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
4'See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
46See notes 31-35 supra, and accompanying text.
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moral and character standards of prospective attorneys."' The Court then examined the methods of discovery used in New York. Rule 9406 has been the
major tool used by the various New York bar admission committees to determine an applicant's "character and general fitness."' The majority admitted that
the rule on its face posed substantial problems regarding the permissible burden
of proof as well as the permissible scope of inquiry into an applicant's political
beliefs."9 The majority avoided these apparent problems by deferring to the interpretation given the rule by the Committee on Character and Fitness. Since
a state can constitutionally administer oaths in support of state and federal
constitutions,"0 the New York committees have read rule 9406 as requiring the
valid support oath. These committees have promised to construe the rule such
that: (1) the burden of proof is not placed upon applicants; (2) the terms
"form of government of the United States" and the "government" refer solely
to the Constitution; and (3) the words "belief" and "loyalty" denote no more
than willingness to take the constitutional oath and the ability to do so in good
faith.51 By accepting the interpretation of the state character committees the
Court avoided what appears to be a direct conflict between rule 9406 and the
5
holding in Speiser v. Randall."
The rule on its face states that the burden is
upon the applicant to present satisfactory proof before he can be certified. Unless there is a significant distinction between veterans seeking a tax exemption
and law students seeking admission to the bar, rule 9406-absent the committees' interpretation-would seem to be governed by that holding.
More important than the sidestepping of the Speiser problem is the Court's
skirting of the basic thrust of the LSCRRC attack on the New York scheme. By
accepting the committee's construction of rule 9406, the Court seemed satisfied
that the vagueness and overbreadth problems posed by the rule itself avoided
the constitutional infirmities that have invalidated similar provisions in other
areas." The Court's reliance on the interpretation of these committees would
be justified if they were state court interpretations."' Similarly, if these committees were state agencies the Court might consider their interpretation as a basis
for clarification."9 But these committees are neither." Their interpretation might
deserve the respect of the Court, as pointed out in Justice Marshall's dissent, but
there was no case law in New York showing the use of the rule as interpreted,
4 Even the four dissenting justices agreed that a state may require that applicants to the
bar possess certain character and general fitness requirements. 401 U.S. at 174, 186 (1971).
4'N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 9406; see note 6 supra.
49401 U.S. at 162.
9
" Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd per curiam,
390 U.S. 36 (1968).
5'401 U.S. at 163.
5357 U.S. 513 (1958). See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
5
See notes 24-30 supra, and accompanying text.
"Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1949).
"9 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1935).
"In Konigsberg 1i the Court referred to the action of the California Bar Committee as
an "essentially administrative type of proceeding." 366 U.S. at 44. The action of a district
or state court in denying an application for admission to its bar upon an evaluation of the
qualifications of an applicant under its rules is a "ministerial act," which is performed by
reason of judicial power, rather than a judicial proceeding. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561
(1945); Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cit. 1953).
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nor any other means of ascertaining whether the application of the rule had
been in the narrow context promised by the committee." The committee's interpretation seems little more than a promise of future action, and the Court
has said that "[wiell-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not
neutralize the vice of a vague law."'"
However, accepting the interpretation given by the committee does not avoid
5 By accepting the
the problems posed by the Court's decision in Bond v. Floyd."
committee's interpretation of rule 9406, the majority simply ignored the holding of Bond. If a unanimous Court can find that the right to administer a support oath does not carry with it the license to let legislators test the sincerity
with which other duly elected legislators take the same oath, then on what
theory can bar admission committees rely on a support oath as authorization to
test the sincerity of bar applicants?
In the last step of the Court's analysis the questionnaires that applicants must
fill out were examined. It was at these questions that the LSCRRC directed its
primary attack. Questions 26 and 27 were the two parts of the questionnaire
considered by the Court."0 In sustaining the validity of question 26, the majority
reasoned that the question taken as a whole merely conformed with the Court's
past decisions on inquiry into associations.6 Certainly, if question 26 were viewed as merely one inquiry into the applicant's associations, the question could
stand on the grounds that it adhered to the Court's scienter-specific intent test62
used in past cases and to the Court's holding in Konigsberg II. However, New
York did not phrase the question as one inquiry, but divided it into two questions requiring two answers that do not meet the scienter-specific intent requirements. The fact that 26(b) may narrow the impermissible scope of 26(a)
would not be sufficient to validate the question under the Court's holding in
In re Stolar ' that a question, which is preparatory to further questions that will
be specific, will not be allowed when the preparatory question is impermissible
in itself. "4
11 401 U.S. at 191. Prior to the LSCRRC attack, the committee did not view the scope
of inquiry so narrowly, but its questionnaires were subsequently revised. Id. n.7.
51Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
59385 U.S. 116 (1966); see note 25 supra.
"The questions, set out in the Court's opinion, were:
26 (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member
of any organization or group of persons which, during the period of your
membership or association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof
should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence, or any unlawful
means? If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below.
(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period
of such membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims
of such organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof
by force, violence or any unlawful means?
27 (a) Is there any reason why you cannot take and subscribe to an oath
or affirmation that you will support the constitutions of the United States and
of the State of New York? If there is, please explain.
(b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without any
mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the
United States?
1 401 U.S. at 165.
62 See notes 32-36 supra, and accompanying text.
63401 U.S. 23 (1971).
MId. at 30.
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In both Baird v. Arizona" and Stolar the Court held that questions which
focus on beliefs and associations cannot be asked by a bar admission committee.
The Court, by allowing question 26 to stand, has permitted New York to force
an applicant to supply information about his associations apparently merely
because the two questions were numbered (a) and (b), rather than as two
separate questions. Why should the way in which a state numbers its questions
have any effect on the substantive content of the questions themselves?
Question 27(b) is the means by which bar admission committees can ascertain the good faith with which an applicant can take the constitutional support oath. Since the sincerity or good faith with which one takes an oath cannot
be tested under the Court's holding in Bond v. Floyd," the interpretation given
to question 27 (b) would seem to fail. Without the interpretation, the question
focuses on applicants' beliefs. It calls on the applicant to confirm, "without any
mental reservation," that he is loyal to and ready to support the Constitution.
Questions that call on an applicant to possess a certain belief and condition a
benefit upon that belief have continually, in the past, been denied effectiveness
by the Supreme Court."
After finding that these questions were a valid exercise of the state's right
to determine whether applicants meet admission standards, the Court upheld
the entire New York procedure. The Court approached the procedures in this
case in piecemeal fashion, sustaining the parts until they validated the whole.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, pointed to the misdirection of the Court's attention:
I believe that appellants' basic First Amendment complaint, transcending the
particulars of the attack, retains its validity. The underlying complaint, strenuously and consistently urged, is that New York's screening system focuses impermissibly on the political activities and viewpoints of Bar applicants, that
the scheme thereby operates to inhibit the exercise of protected expressive and
associational freedoms by law students and others, and that this chilling effect
is not justified as the necessary impact of a system designed to winnow out
those applicants demonstrably unfit to practice law."8
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court was given a timely opportunity in Wadmond, Baird, and
Stolar to clear up this confusing area of constitutional law. The dockets of the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have been filled for years with cases
in which people have been denied the right to practice law or hold public or
even private jobs because public authorities have been suspicious of their beliefs
and associations. Justice Black, speaking for the majority in Baird, pointed out
that the result of all this litigation has only been "thousands of pages of confusing formulas, refined reasonings, and puzzling holdings that touch on the
same suspicions and fears about citizenship and loyalties."" These three cases
U.S. 1 (1971).
G6385
U.S. 116 (1966).
67See notes

65401

19-23 supra, and accompanying text. See also Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
8 401 U.S. at 186.
69401 U.S. at 4.
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NOTES

could have served as a springboard for the Court to settle the questions of the
constitutionally permissible focus on an individual's beliefs and associations.
While Baird and Stolar follow the same logic and are consistent with each
other, Wadmond runs opposite them in reasoning and result. Procedurally
Wadmond is different from the other two cases since no specific person had
been denied admission by the state of New York, and the entire bar admission
procedure was attacked. The dissimilarities end there. Substantively, the basic
tenets used in Baird and Stolar retain their validity and apply equally as well
to the situation in Wadmond. The main idea expressed in both Baird and Stolar,
that inquisitions into bar applicants' views and beliefs will not be allowed when
they are designed to serve as a basis for barring that applicant from the practice of law, seems to have been lost in Wadmond. The difference in result can
be partially explained by the switch of Mr. Justice Stewart from the invalidating side in Baird and Stolar to the sustaining side in Wadmond. Justice Stewart's main concern in these cases focused around the states' use of the scienterspecific intent requirement in their questions to bar applicants."0
Viewing the Court's decision in Wadmond from two levels, its break with
the thrust of the other two cases does not seem valid. The Court's decision to
accept the bar committee's interpretation of rule 9406, from a procedural viewpoint, seems unusual constitutional procedure in light of the committee's lowly
position in the judicial scheme. And accepting the interpretation, from a substantive viewpoint, raises serious questions as to the validity of that interpretation when compared to prior case law. The Court's holding in Bond could
only be overcome by some kind of a distinction, which the Court does not draw,
between a Georgia legislator and an about-to-be-licensed attorney.
It must be remembered that the right of a lawyer or bar applicant to practice
his chosen profession was at stake in all three of these cases. When a state seeks
to deny someone the right to practice that profession, it should "proceed according to the most exacting demands of due process of law.""' As Justice Black
put it in his dissent in Wadmond: "[T] his must mean at least that the right of
a lawyer or Bar applicant to practice cannot be left to the mercies of his prospective or present competitors.""
Individuals must be afforded the opportunity to express their views in any
manner condoned within the law. The Constitution, therefore, must provide
stringent safeguards for those individuals so that they will not later be denied
the right to practice law because of passing membership in radical organizations. Neither should their desires to join organizations be stifled by procedures
they must meet in the future. Justice Black, in his dissent in In re Anastaplo,
gave the best reason for the legal profession being filled with men of different
ideas and temperaments: "The legal profession will lose much of its nobility
and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like [Charles Evans
Hughes, John W. Davis, Lord Erskine, James Otis, and Clarence Darrow]. To
0

See Justice Stewart's concurring opinions in Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 9 (1971),
and In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 31 (1971).
71401 U.S. at 174 (Black, J., dissenting).
7

71Id.

